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exists, is certainly questionable. To say that the act of the servant was
lawful because committed against his wife would be to pervert the mean-
ing and effect of the disability. The chief bone of contention, it seems,
has been whether the liability of the master is primary or secondary,
derivative or non-derivative. Less emphasis should be placed on this
phase of the controversy, and more careful thought given to the broad
and general principles behind the employer's liability. He has been held
responsible because it has been found desirable that those injuries inci-
dental to carrying on an enterprise be made a part of the cost of opera-
tion. Tiffany, Agency, p. 100, 2nd Ed. (1924). Are there any prac-
tical reasons that necessitate a different result here? It is believed not.
It may be argued that the servant in driving for the defendant, was
engaged in the project of earning a living for himself and his wife, and
that the project should bear its costs of operation. But such a rule, if
carried to its logical conclusion, would disable any one dependent for
support on the negligent employee from suing the employer for injuries.
If we can apply the analogy of a contract and say that the transaction
was between the injured party and the principal, thus regarding the
agent husband as a mere conduit, it is difficult to see why a personal
disability existing between husband and wife (inter se) should be allowed
to defeat the wife's right to recover.
WALTER LEAR GORDON, JR.
LIABILITY OF AGENT ON SIGNATURE MADE IN BEHALF OF
CORPORATION - NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
The plaintiff company held two promissory notes, reading, "I, we,
or either of us, promise to pay," etc., and signed, "Central Freight-
ways, Inc., John L. Cannon, Jr., Treas., Lyman H. Treadway, V. P."
The plaintiff brought an action on these notes against the agents whose
signatures appeared thereon. The defendants demurred to the petition
on the ground that it did not state a cause of action against the agents.
The demurrer was sustained and plaintiff appealed. Held, that, under
Section 8125, Ohio General Code, the individual signers are not per-
sonally liable. Weygandt, C. J., dissented. Cannon, Jr. v. Miller
Rubber Co., 128 Ohio St. 72, i9O N.E. 210, 39 O.L.R. 656, 40 Bull.
145 (1934).
The statute above referred to, being identical with Section 20 of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, provides that "When the
instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words indicating
274
NOTES AND COMMENTS 275
that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capac-
ity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly authorized. But
the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as filling a
representative character without disclosing his principal does not exempt
him from personal liability."
Where the officers of the corporation have ostensibly signed in a
representative capacity within the limits of their authority for a disclosed
principal, the instrument is on its face the obligation of the corporation.
.dungst v. Creque, 72 Ohio St. 551, 74 N.E. 1073 (1905); Jump v.
Sparling, 218 Mass. 324, 105 N.E. 878 (914); New England Elec-
tric Co. v. Shook, 27 Colo. App. 30, 145 Pac. 1002 (915); Consum-
er' Tu4ne & Mach. Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Thermo Tank Co., 196
Iowa 64, 194 N.W. 290 (1923); Kilpatrick v. Plummer, 145 Okla.
117, 291 Pac. 501 (193o); Hughes v. Washington Finance Corp.,
218 Ky. 729, 292 S.W. 335 (1927); Wright v. Drury Petroleum
Corp., 229 Mich. 542, 201 N.W. 484 (1924); Mathis v. Liberty
Straw Spreader Co., 238 Ili. App. 467 (1925). Under similar circum-
stances an earlier Ohio case reached the opposite conclusion. McKisson
v. Thomas, I8 O.C.C.N.S. 443 (191). Accord: Briel v. Exchange
National Bank, 172 Ala. 475, 55.*0O 8o8 (191 I); Daniel v. Glidden,
38 Wash. 556, So Pac. 811 (1905). The court in the principal case
through dictum approved the opinion of Chief Justice Cardozo in the
case of New Georgia National Bank v. Lippman, 249 N.Y. 307, 164
N.E. io8, 6o A.L.R. 1344 (1928), in which it was held that it logic-
ally follows from the statute that if the officers of the corporation act
without being duly authorized, they are individually liable. Pain v.
Holtcamp, IO F. (2d) 443 (8th. C.C.A., 1926); Austin, Nichols Co.
v. Gross, 98 Conn. 782, 12o Adt. 596 (1923); Durham v. Blood,
207 Mass. 512, 93 N.E. 804 (1911). If the principal is not disclosed
on the face of the instrument, it is the personal obligation of the officers.
Watt v. German Say. Bank, 183 Iowa 346, 165 N.W. 897 (1917);
Baird v. Publishers' National Service Bureau, 199 N.W. 757 (N.D.,
1924); Sutherland State Bank v. Dial, 103 Neb. 136, 17o N.W. 666
(i918). Numerous cases have held the officers liable if the instrument
failed to show the representative capacity of the individual signers. Toon
v. McGaw, 74 Wash. 335, 133 Pac. 469, L.R.A. I9 I 5 A (1913);
Belmont Dairy Co. v. Thrasher, 124 Md. 320, 92 Ad. 766 (1914);
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. v. Rossman, 196 Mo. App. 78, 19o S.W. 636
(i916); Farmers' State Bank of Newport v. Lamon, 132 Wash. 369,
231 Pac. 952, 42 A.L.R. 1072 (1925). But where the officers have
apparently signed in behalf of the corporation, it is presumed that they
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acted with authority, and the petition does not state a cause of action
against them in the absence of allegations setting forth facts to the effect
that they acted without authority. Kennedy & Parsons v. Lander Dairy
Co., 36 Wyo. 58, 252 Pac. 1036 (1924); Eisinger v. E. J. Murphy
CO., 48 App. D.C. 476, 52 App. D.C. 197, 285 F. 921 (1922);
Jump v. Sparling, supra. The view thus adopted by the Supreme Court
of Ohio is supported by the great weight of authority in this country.
Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, 256 (5 th Ed., 1932).
The court further held that the words, "I, we, or either of us,
promise," etc., do not change the import of the instrument so as to make
the agents personally liable. Williams v. Harrs, 198 Ill. 501, 64 N.E.
988 (19o02); New England Electric Co. v. Shook, supra; Kilpatrick
v. Plummer, supra. The dissenting opinion, which was based entirely
on this point, took the opposite view, holding that these words, appearing
in four vital places in the body of the note, undoubtedly imposed per-
sonal liability on the agents. The same position was taken in the case
of Huron County Banking Go. v. The Oberlin Co., 19 O.C.C.N.S. 15 1
( 911 ). Where the intention to bind the corporation is as aparent as it
is in the principal case, it would seem that the view taken by the major-
ity of the court is the better one, being more in accord with modern
principles and authority. The fact that the agents did not place such a
word as "by" or "per" before their signatures was also held to be im-
material. Accord: Aiungst v. Creque, supra. Contra: Briel v. Ex-
change National Bank, supra.
A discussion and a list of decisions concerning the law in Ohio on
this question before the enactment of the present statute are contained
in I O.Jur. 718. As to the admissibility of parol evidence to show whQ
was actually intended to be bound by the instrument see 1 O.Jur. 722;
Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law, 263 (5 th Ed., 1932).
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RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR - TORT LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR
NEGLIGENCE OF AGENT HIRED FOR SINGLE UNDERTAKING
The defendant, an undertaker, contracted to supply transportation
for a funeral party. Plaintiff, one of the party, was injured because of
the negligent operation of the car by the driver. The defendant hired
the car and the driver from a livery service to augment his facilities for
handling the funeral. The trial court directed a verdict for the defend-
ant. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Held, the jury
should have been asked to determine whether the negligent driver was
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